THERE is a political reality that many critics of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. may find uncomfortable: If the overriding objective is to defeat the Duterte brand politically, then one has to give Marcos Jr. some slack. This is not an endorsement, nor an invitation to forget history, abandon criticism, or suspend demands for accountability. It is simply an acknowledgment of how political contests work.
In electoral warfare, the enemy of an enemy can become an ally. This does not necessarily mean a friend, and certainly not permanently, but an ally for a particular objective. Coalitions are often built not around complete ideological agreement but around shared interests and common threats. The strategic question is therefore simple: If you want the Duterte political machinery defeated, who currently has the institutional and electoral capacity to help accomplish that?
The collapse of UniTeam fundamentally altered Philippine politics. What was presented in 2022 as an alliance between the Marcos and Duterte political families has become an open struggle over power, succession and political survival. That conflict creates a strategic opportunity for groups that have long opposed Duterte politics.
The mistake would be to imagine that every political battle must be fought simultaneously. Many anti-Duterte forces remain suspicious of Marcos Jr. Some opposed both Marcos and Duterte in 2022, while others carry historical grievances against the Marcos family that cannot simply be erased. They should continue criticizing the administration over governance, human rights, corruption and other legitimate concerns. Giving someone political slack is not the same as granting political immunity.
But there is a difference between holding Marcos Jr. accountable and treating Marcos Jr. and the Dutertes as politically interchangeable on every issue. They are no longer interchangeable because they are fighting each other. Anyone seeking the defeat of one must understand the strategic consequences of weakening the other.
Suppose the objective is to prevent the restoration of Duterte-style politics in 2028. What would indiscriminately attacking Marcos Jr. accomplish if the immediate beneficiary is the Duterte camp? This is where moral absolutism can become strategically self-defeating. One can remain critical of Marcos Jr. while recognizing that, on particular issues, his interests may coincide with those seeking to prevent another Duterte presidency.
Politics is not a religious club where everyone who fails an ideological purity test can simply be declared equally unacceptable. Electoral politics deals with actual configurations of power: political families, institutions, regional bases, patronage networks, media ecosystems, resources and voting blocs. These determine who can actually win, regardless of how morally satisfying our positions may sound.
The Duterte brand remains formidable because it possesses many of these assets. It has a deeply loyal electoral base and an aggressive social-media ecosystem. It thrives on grievance, resentment and anti-establishment rhetoric, and has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to transform political attacks into narratives of persecution.
Defeating it therefore requires more than denunciation. It requires coalition-building, and coalitions are almost always messy. They bring together people who may disagree profoundly on history, ideology, personalities and policies but nevertheless recognize that they confront a common adversary.
The historical irony is obvious. The Marcos-Duterte alliance demonstrated this in 2022. Their supporters overlooked substantial differences because they understood the arithmetic of power. UniTeam was constructed because combining their electoral bases made victory easier. Their opponents should learn something from that experience.
If those who oppose the Duterte brand divide themselves into Marcos critics, liberals, progressives, centrists, independents and smaller factions that spend more energy attacking one another than confronting their common adversary, then the Duterte camp benefits. This does not mean everyone must become pro-Marcos. It means recognizing the difference between a strategic alliance and political surrender.
One can support investigations into alleged abuses involving Duterte-era officials without endorsing everything Marcos Jr. does. One can welcome institutional resistance to Duterte political influence while criticizing corruption or incompetence under the present administration. One can defend constitutional institutions without becoming a Marcos loyalist. Politics allows such distinctions.
Unfortunately, social media has trained people to think in binaries. Defend one action of Marcos Jr. and you are labeled a Marcos loyalist. Criticize him tomorrow and someone may call you a Duterte supporter. Nuance becomes betrayal, while strategic thinking becomes political disloyalty.
Giving Marcos Jr. "some slack" does not mean giving him a blank check. It means choosing battles intelligently. Criticize the administration when criticism is deserved. Demand transparency and accountability. Challenge bad policies and defend human rights. But do not automatically oppose something simply because Marcos Jr. supports it.
More importantly, those who want the Duterte brand defeated should not sabotage actions that weaken Duterte-style politics merely because Marcos Jr. happens to benefit. Ideological consistency may feel satisfying, but it can also produce precisely the political outcome one claims to oppose. Strategy requires judging not only the purity of one's position but also its consequences.
The immediate electoral battle and the longer democratic struggle must also be distinguished. Alliances of convenience may be necessary now, but democratic institutions must ultimately be strengthened. Defeating the Duterte brand must eventually mean confronting the conditions that sustain it, including disinformation, personality-based politics, institutional distrust, and authoritarian political language.
Political strategy begins with reality, not with the world we would prefer to inhabit. The Marcos and Duterte camps are locked in a struggle that will shape the road to 2028. Those who want the Duterte brand defeated must decide whether maintaining absolute political purity is more important than constructing a broad political front capable of actually defeating it.
This does not require loving Marcos Jr., forgetting the past, or remaining silent when his administration deserves criticism. It requires strategic discrimination, knowing when to oppose, criticize, remain neutral, and recognize when interests temporarily converge. The enemy of my enemy is not automatically my friend. But in politics, he does not always have to be a friend to become, for a particular battle, an ally.
We need to accept the fact that defeating Duterte in 2028 would include Marcos Jr. as that ally.
The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. He is also vice chairman of People’s Television Network, Inc. (PTVNI).
