ON Feb. 25 this year, the nation marked the 40th anniversary of the 1986 EDSA “revolt.” This ended the 21-year-old presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and installed Cory Aquino, the widow of the late former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, who was assassinated in 1983, as revolutionary president. As in previous years, the celebration centered on the roles played by the military, civil society and the Catholic clergy in ousting Marcos.
But completely undiscussed is the biggest elephant in the room — the role of the United States in the entire thing. Forty years after the event, it is not imprudent to ask, was EDSA 1 not an American project?
Following Ninoy Aquino’s assassination, Marcos’ relationship with the US began to deteriorate. I discuss this at some length in my book, “All Is Grace” (Solidaridad Publishing House, Manila, 2021). US Ambassador Stephen Bosworth tirelessly communicated Washington’s concern to Marcos, but the latter, who regarded himself as President Ronald Reagan’s close friend, doubted if the ambassador faithfully reflected Reagan’s views. So, in September 1985, Reagan sent Sen. Paul Laxalt as his personal envoy to talk to Marcos.
Among the primary concerns were the smoldering communist insurgency and its possible impact on the US military bases in Clark and Subic, the lease on which was to expire in 1991; the tightening grip of “crony capitalism” and its effect on economic competition; and the unanswered questions on Marcos’ health and presidential succession.
One immediate question was the status of Gen. Fabian Ver. After being indicted in the Ninoy Aquino killing, he had taken a leave of absence as Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief of staff and presidential security chief. However, his future status remained unclear. Would he be eventually cleared and reinstated, or sidelined and given a new job altogether?
The US political and military establishment preferred the West Point-educated AFP vice chief of staff Fidel V. Ramos to take over the Philippines’ military command. But Marcos was more comfortable with Ver.
Amid mounting protests, Laxalt called on Marcos in Malacañang on Oct. 16, 1985. Playing on the strongman’s ego, Laxalt and other American interlocutors suggested the crisis had undermined Marcos’ credibility, which they claimed was now in utter decline.
For Marcos, this was pure and simple drivel. So, on Nov. 3, 1985, on ABC’s “This Week with David Brinkley,” he announced a “snap presidential election” on Jan. 17, 1986, to put an end to this “silly claim” that he was losing his grip on his government. The announcement meant that the snap polls would be held one year ahead of the scheduled 1987 elections. Marcos declared that he would take on any challenger from the opposition. The date was eventually moved to Feb. 7, 1986.
That evening, following the snap election announcement, I had an unexpected visit from Marcos’ appointments secretary, Ambassador Mark Ruiz. He carried a highly confidential and urgent invitation from the president.
We drove to Malacañang in an unmarked vehicle and entered the president’s study using the back entrance. I had a feeling of déjà vu as I faced the same man I had spoken to for the first time in the same room 17 years before. I was genuinely happy to see him, and he seemed happy to see me as well.
“I wanted to see you because I just called a snap presidential election. I would like to know what you think about it,” the president said.
“I caught it on TV, Mr. President,” I said, “and I’m still trying to process it. My first thought was that they’re giving you a graceful way out.”
“No, no, no, far from it,” he said. “I’ll lose in some places, but lose small; I’ll win in most places, but win big.”
“I hope it turns out that way, Mr. President, but you can’t be too careful,” I said.
The snap elections were held on Feb. 7, 1986. Foreign observers came to monitor the process. The chairman of the US Senate foreign relations committee, Sen. Richard Lugar, led a US delegation of 20 highly credentialed election observers, while some political organizations sent another delegation of various nationalities. The presence of high-powered observers did not discourage the commission of electoral fraud. It only made sure that any allegation of fraud against Marcos was instantly validated.
On Feb. 9, 35 computer technicians walked out of the Commission on Elections’ tabulation center at the Philippine International Convention Center and sought refuge at the Baclaran Church nearby. The group was led by the wife of the intelligence officer of then-Defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile, who ended up leading the military mutiny against Marcos. They were protesting against alleged manipulation of the election results. The leader of the group would be given sanctuary in Australia after this incident.
On Feb. 13, 1986, Cardinal Ricardo Vidal of Cebu, as president of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), came out with a statement declaring that “in our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct” and could not provide a moral basis for the continued actions of government.
On Feb. 19, 1986, the US Senate, by a vote of 85 to 9, declared the Philippine elections were “marked by such widespread fraud that they cannot be considered a fair reflection of the will of the people of the Philippines.” It sounded like a paraphrase of the CBCP statement.
On Feb. 22, a group of military officers identified with the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) penetrated the defense perimeter of Malacañang in an attempt to capture Marcos. They were captured by palace guards and presented by Marcos to the public on television. That same day, Cory Aquino flew to Cebu to stay with some religious sisters there. In the afternoon, Ambassador Bosworth and President Reagan’s special envoy, Philip Habib, called on Marcos and asked him to do away with Ver.
But this issue was quickly overtaken by reports that Marcos had ordered Enrile’s arrest because of his reported involvement in the failed coup by the RAM military officers. Enrile reached out for support to Cardinal Sin, who responded positively to his appeal. At 6:45 p.m., he and General Ramos announced their withdrawal of allegiance and support to Marcos. Ver tried to prevent the buildup of rebel forces by getting Marcos to order an attack, but Marcos ordered the troops not to attack. It was not clear at this point who would replace Marcos if he were ousted, but Enrile made it clear in a TV interview, Cory Aquino would be asked to lead. Thus, the EDSA crowds began to chant, “Cory, Cory, Cory!”
In Washington, Habib said, “The Marcos era has ended.” George Shultz said, “Marcos can no longer govern effectively.” And Laxalt said the only thing Marcos could do was “to cut and cut clean.” On Feb. 25, Marcos and Cory staged separate inaugurals — Cory at Club Filipino and Marcos at Malacañang. I attended the Cory inaugural. Marcos and his family were then flown by the US Air Force to their exile in Hawaii, where Marcos died in 1989.
I last saw Marcos upon his invitation in Hawaii, after the 1987 Philippine senatorial elections. I had addressed a group in Washington, D.C., that included Sen. Jesse Helms, Gen. Richard Stillwell and some State Department functionaries, about the “farcical” results of those elections, and was asked by Marcos to see him before I went home. In Makiki, he remained hopeful that his friend Reagan would still be able to do something about his exile, but he grudgingly admitted in our conversation that I was not wrong in 1986 about the Americans.
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