Last of two parts
THE past few weeks have seen scientists and weather forecasters arriving at a consensus that a powerful El Niño is a certainty and will likely be followed by fewer but more powerful storms.
Also, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (Pagasa) said there is a 79-percent chance of an El Niño happening in June to August, with storms hitting the country in the latter part of the year. The bad news is that the powerful El Niño will last until early next year.
The Pagasa has labeled this year’s El Niño as “very strong.” Over social media, the upcoming El Niño has also been tagged as having “Godzilla” proportions.
This early, India is feeling the brunt of the very strong El Niño, recording temperatures as high as 48 degrees Celsius in some areas.
In the Philippines, the highest heat index recorded during the peak of the 2024 El Niño was 55 degrees Celsius, registered in Guiuan, Eastern Samar, on May 26, 2024. And the scary thing is, the 2024 El Niño was not tagged as extreme or very strong.
The 2024 El Niño event also showed that rice was the most vulnerable crop during dry spells and drought. That needs no explanation.
To reiterate, the 2023-2024 El Niño drove rice inflation to as high as 24.4 percent in March 2024, and was double digits from September 2023 to August 2024, or for almost one year.
The Philippines also imported a record 4.68 million metric tons (MT) of rice in 2024, underscoring the effect of the “normal” El Niño.
With barely a month left before the very strong El Niño starts to unleash its wrath, let us study how the government and stakeholders must respond.
I mentioned in the first part of this two-part series that a one-size-fits-all approach would not work to address the challenges of the very strong El Niño.
Geographical analysis
This is the view of the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice), which recommends a “geographically-targeted” approach.
PhilRice is also enlisting the cooperation of the Department of Agriculture Regional Field Offices, National Irrigation Administration (NIA), National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), local government units (LGUs), and the Philippine Crop Insurance Corp. (PCIC) to contain the effects of the very strong El Niño.
According to analysis by PhilRice, the following regions showed the largest “negative production anomalies” during the first and second quarter production periods during El Niño events: Northern Mindanao, Zamboanga Peninsula, Central Visayas, Davao Region, and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
PhilRice added that area contraction, or the reduction of area planted to rice, was still a major issue in several regions.
Looking at the list of the affected regions, this does not include Central Luzon and the Cagayan Valley, which are major rice-producing regions.
On the other hand, the regions that showed negative production anomalies due to the El Niño during the third and fourth quarters, according to PhilRice, were BARMM, Ilocos Region, Central Visayas, and Cagayan Valley, but were driven mostly by a reduction in area planted to rice.
The analysis of PhilRice clearly shows one thing: During dry spells or droughts caused by the El Niño, there are a big number of rice farmers prefer not to plant. That makes economic sense, as farmers who do not get enough assistance from the government during El Niño will likely incur massive losses that will affect their capability to plant in the next cropping.
PhilRice also emphasized that “harvested areas contraction appears to be the large pathway,” meaning the El Niño can discourage many rice farmers to plant.
On the other hand, more farmers plant rice during La Niña events because of water availability. Also, while La Niña causes a uniform drop in rice production at the national level during the second and third quarters, there are positive outcomes in the first and second quarters of the succeeding year, also because of more areas planted to rice.
What is alarming is that during the first quarter of this year, palay (unhusked rice) production dropped by 6.26 percent to 4.4 million metric tons (MT), a six-year low. The significant drop can be attributed to the lesser hectarage planted to rice — 750,130 hectares instead of 1.01 million hectares.
More measures needed
I already mentioned a number of the measures being rolled out to mitigate the effects of the El Niño in the first part of this series. These include utilizing drought-resistant rice varieties and extending fertilizer assistance, farm mechanization, irrigation support, credit assistance, and intensified extension and farmer training services.
The use of biofertilizers is also being pushed to reduce the dependence on inorganic inputs.
Let me add that the Department of Agriculture (DA) needs to upscale immediately the application of the alternate wetting-drying (AWD) system that can reduce water usage in rice farms by up to 30 percent.
But we need to do more, such as the LGUs and DA assisting farmers to be covered by PCIC’s crop insurance programs, so the hectarage to be planted to rice can be increased compared to the previous cropping. This should be intensified in areas where farmers literally quit planting rice during the last cropping.
And we should not ignore the powerful storms that will visit the Philippines after the very strong El Niño, because their impacts can be unforgiving.
So, this early, the government must — and I say must — start building real flood control systems, and integrate these with existing small water impounding projects (SWIPs), and irrigation systems.
How much will that cost? Perhaps P100 million per project, and building 200 of these will cost around P20 billion. The key is to locate these projects in strategic areas, and not just anywhere, like what happened to the numerous ghost or substandard projects under the flood control scandal.
And more investments for flood control projects must be made in the next years, which should all be integrated into water conservation infrastructure. Let’s also start building water recharging systems in every province where there are agriculture enclaves.
My fear is future El Niño events will approximate the strength of the very strong, powerful, super, or “Godzilla” types. There is no discounting this, as humanity has never made significant steps in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Powerful storms have also become more common, especially after strong El Niño episodes.
PhilRice pointed out that the general response of the country to El Niño events is usually “reactionary.” This should change.
Hence, we should learn lessons from this year’s El Niño and the powerful storms that will follow, and develop templates for each region on how to prepare ahead, and deal with the potential effects.
We also cannot ignore the other realities that can create a “perfect storm.”
For one, the country’s debt has ballooned to P18.49 trillion, constraining spending for social services and even the agriculture sector. Meanwhile, the local economy is sputtering with economic growth forecasted at below 5 percent or lower this year.
The global economy is also expected to suffer from the lingering effects of the Middle East war, which will make it difficult for countries relying on exports to recover.
The oil refineries wrecked during the Middle East war will take years to rebuild, which will result in lesser oil and fertilizer production. And this point, the country still remains vulnerable to global energy shocks.
Believe me — this will not be the last “perfect storm.”
